docs(prd): add PRD 0015 — Report abuse without becoming a source of it - #64
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Attack sources are usually compromised third-party machines whose owners do not know. Reporting to the provider is the only mechanism that gets them cleaned up rather than merely blocked, and shared feeds are how small operators benefit from each other's observations. The problem is that an automated reporter makes PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS about other people's infrastructure, and every failure mode lands on someone else. Reporting a CGNAT or corporate NAT range attributes an attack to thousands of innocent users, and feeds propagate it. Worse, an attacker who can generate traffic appearing to come from a competitor can weaponize the reporter into a distributed reputation attack — the reporter becomes the abuse. So the central requirement is an evidentiary bar, not throughput: corroboration from a high-precision detector, a completed TCP handshake so spoofed sources are structurally unreportable, carrier ranges never reported, off by default, dry-run first, and retraction available because the module will eventually be wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
vu1nz Security Review0 finding(s) in PR #? No security issues found. |
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Specification for the
abuse-reportercore module, listed inPRD.mdand not yet specified.Attack sources are usually compromised third-party machines whose owners do not know. Reporting to the provider is the only mechanism that gets them cleaned up rather than merely blocked, and shared feeds are how small operators benefit from each other's observations.
The problem is that an automated reporter makes PUBLIC ACCUSATIONS about other people's infrastructure, and every failure mode lands on someone else. Reporting a CGNAT or corporate NAT range attributes an attack to thousands of innocent users, and feeds propagate it. Worse, an attacker who can generate traffic appearing to come from a competitor can weaponize the reporter into a distributed reputation attack — the reporter becomes the abuse.
So the central requirement is an evidentiary bar, not throughput: corroboration from a high-precision detector, a completed TCP handshake so spoofed sources are structurally unreportable, carrier ranges never reported, off by default, dry-run first, and retraction available because the module will eventually be wrong.
Spec only — no implementation in this PR.